

Welcome to a Texas Police Chiefs Association Foundation (TPCAF) training session. Thank you for participating in some of the best leadership focused training in Texas. Whether you are seeking the coveted Law Enforcement Command Officer Professional (LECOP) status or taking an individual class to sharpen your skill set, we hope you find this class personally and professionally rewarding.

Proceeds from training sessions like this support the TPCA Foundation's work, including the Fallen Officer Fund. The Fallen Officer Fund provides a \$10,000 check to the family of any peace officer killed in the line of duty in Texas. This includes Federal, State, county, local, and other peace officers working in Texas. The goal of the Fallen Officer Fund is to assist the family with any immediate needs by providing funds within 24-48 hours after the line of duty death. The family of a fallen officer should not have to worry about having money to pay a bill, flying in family from out of town, buying groceries, or any other need. Your attendance at this training session directly supports these families.

We encourage you to consider becoming a member of the Texas Police Chiefs Association (TPCA). TPCA is the largest association of police leaders in Texas and one of the largest state police chiefs associations in the nation. TPCA provides members with professional networking opportunities, a voice on legislative matters, resources, training opportunities, and access to model policies through the Texas Law Enforcement Accreditation Program. Please visit <u>www.texaspolicechiefs.org</u> for more information.

We hope you will check out our course catalog at <u>Texas Police Chiefs Association</u> <u>Conference & Training Site</u> to learn more about other training opportunities available.

Please consider donating to the Fallen Officer Fund

TEXAS POLICE CHIEFS ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION

To make a difference, please scan below





Open To All Texas Law Enforcement Agencies

Classes offered throughout different regions of Texas

Aims to provide the very best of executive and command level training for chiefs, commanders and supervisors to lead and manage throughout their organizations

Classes are focused on leadership with common themes of fairness, dignity, respect, trust and non-biased practices that create healthy organization and community confidence.





TRAINING TOMORROW'S LEADERS TODAY!



Law Enforcement Command Officer Program

Earn acknowledgment as a trained Law Enforcement Command Officer by completing a series of 10 training courses. Classes are open to all Texas Law Enforcement Agencies and designed to develop leadership skills and apply those skills to specific assignments.

> TRACK A Focuses on Individual Leadership Skills

TRACK B Focuses On Leadership In An Organization & Influencing Culture



Plan on attending the annual TPCA Conference.

Register at Texas Police Chiefs Association Conference & Training Site

Texas Law Enforcement Accreditation Program



The Texas Police Chiefs Accreditation Program allows Law Enforcement Agencies to voluntarily demonstrate compliance with over 170 best practices, developed by professionals, to ensure efficient service delivery and protection of individual rights.



External Review of policies & operations

Enhances knowledge of policing & procedures

Decreased exposure to liability risk & cost

Demonstrates to the community the police department meets or exceeds the highest standards of Law Enforcement excellence

ENDALL COUNTY









WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW:

Open to all Law Enforcement Agencies

POLICE

- Financial obligations: new application fee, annual program fee, travel costs for review team
- Program manager is required to complete 8 hours of program training - Agency heads are highly encouraged to attend
- Agency has two years to complete the process
- Accredited status is granted for four years. During this period, agencies are required to submit annual reports to demonstrate ongoing compliance with relevant standards
- Participating entities may qualify for scholarship to cover inital fee



www.texaspolicechiefs.org



The Texas Police Chiefs Association (TPCA) is the largest association of police executives in Texas and one of the largest state police chiefs associations in the country. With a diverse group of experts in all areas of policing, TPCA provides a wide range of professional services to Texas governmental entities.

Police Chief Search and Selection	Co
Staffing Studies	
Executive Level Training	

omprehensive Organizational Studies Strategic Planning Accreditation Program

POLICE CHIEF SEARCH AND SELECTION

The Texas Police Chiefs Association offers valuable technical assistance in evaluating resumes and pinpointing credible candidates. Utilizing these resources can enhance your ability to choose the most suitable candidate for your department. Additionally, the Association can deliver a comprehensive selection process, typically at a significantly lower cost than many consulting firms.

STAFFING STUDIES

We provide Staffing Studies that use the IACP and ICMA recommended workload models to determine the staffing options for various policing strategies.

COMPREHENSIVE ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES

A comprehensive Organizational Audit is beneficial, as it examines all departmental operations to ensure adherence to legal standards and best practices. This evaluation provides an analysis of crime control strategies, necessary staffing levels, and may include an anonymous employee survey.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

A roadmap providing organizational direction can be an effective management and budget tool. TPCA can assist law enforcement agencies in developing a strategic plan and can facilitate the strategic planning process for other city departments.

EXECUTIVE LEVEL TRAINING

TPCA provides quality training around the state. The Law Enforcement Command Officers Program (LECOP) offers a series of 10 courses to command level officers and supervisors covering the full range of law enforcement operations including Developing Leaders, Managing Administrative Operations, Patrol, Traffic, Special Operations and Criminal Investigations. Upon completing the full course series, they receive a LECOP Certificate and special recognition. All TPCA classes emphasize the importance of Leadership.

ACCREDITATION PROGRAM

A nationally recognized program with over 170 standards outlining best practices for law enforcement agencies in Texas. This program includes independent review of policies and operations of an agency, ensures efficient service delivery to the public, protection of individual rights, and decreased exposure for liability and risk.

FOR MORE INFORMATION PLEASE EMAIL GELLIS@TEXASPOLICECHIEFS.ORG OR CALL 512-281-5400



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- Instructor Bio
- Managing Patrol Operations Presentation
- Abstracts and Overviews of Studies and Programs
- Patrol Staffing Computation





Texas Police Chiefs Association Foundation

Overview and Macro Curriculum Managing Patrol Operations

Rationale:

This class will prepare you to understand the options available for organizing the patrol function within your department to be most productive and to use your resources to the greatest extent. Our citizens expect the police to be there when they call and our city governments expect us to do so with the least resources possible. Walking that tightrope is always a challenge.

Overview:

This 16 hour course is designed for Chiefs, Patrol Commanders as well as Patrol Supervisors. This course allows agencies to understand and manage the forces that impact your ability to provide patrol services in your community. The class addresses most of the contemporary issues that trouble Patrol Operations.

Course Goals:

At the conclusion of this course, the participant will:

- 1. Understand the major police patrol experiments and results from national studies.
- 2. Understand the advantages and disadvantages of different Patrol Shift options.
- 3. Understand effective patrol tactics and strategies.
- 4. Understand staffing options and methods of determining appropriate staffing.
- 5. Relate useful leadership cues to patrol operations to provide a healthy organizational culture.

Schedule of Topics:

Day One	0800-0900 hrs	Welcome, Registration and Introduction
	0900-1000 hrs	The Police and Patrol Missions
	1000-1200 hrs	Overview of Research and History
	1200-1300 hrs	Lunch
	1300-1500 hrs	What Works, Doesn't Work and What We Don't Know
	1500-1700 hrs	Patrol Staffing – Various Models and the TPCA Model
Day Two	0800-1000 hrs	Shift Decisions
	1000-1100 hrs	The Effects of Sleep Deprivation
	1100-1200 hrs	Supervision, Various Roles
	1200-1300 hrs	Lunch
	1300-1400 hrs	Audits and Inspections
	1400-1600 hrs	Leadership and Morale
	1600-1700 hrs	Leadership, Motivation and Organizational Dynamics

Instructors:

Marlin R Price, Chief of Police (ret.)	Administrative Services Manager, Plano Police Department
Scott Holt, Chief of Police	Lorena Police Department



Texas Police Chiefs Association Instructor Bio

Chief Marlin Price (ret.)

Chief Price served in the Dallas Police Department from 1972 until 2000, retiring as the Assistant Chief of Police over the Special Investigations Bureau. During his tenure with DPD, he served in every rank from Police Officer to Assistant Chief, holding various commands during that time. He graduated from DPD Police Academy Class #123 after being elected Class President. He was assigned to Southeast Patrol until promoting to Sergeant in 1976 and being assigned as a Jail Supervisor. In 1977, Chief Price was promoted to Lieutenant and assigned to the Property Division. Promoted to Captain in 1979, he held commands in the Identification, Personnel, Planning and Research, and Crimes Against Persons Sections until being promoted to Deputy Chief of Police in 1985. As a Deputy Chief, he commanded the Criminal Investigations Division and the Southwest Patrol Division. In 1988 Chief Price was again promoted to the rank of Assistant Chief of Police. At that rank he commanded the Professional Standards Bureau, the Northeast and Southwest Patrol Divisions, the Criminal Investigations Bureau and the Special Investigations Bureau. From 2000 until 2005, after retiring from the Dallas Police Department, Chief Price served as Chief of Police for Southlake, Texas. He supervised a total of 58 sworn and 3 non-sworn officers providing both police and public safety services to a city of 23,000 population. He also served as the Administrative Division Commander of the Plano Police Department from 2017 until 2022.

Chief Price is known as a law enforcement management consultant and served as a CALEA assessor and team leader from 2001 to 2007. He was the Program Director for the TPCA Foundation's Best Practices Recognition Program at its inception, overseeing and facilitating the creation of the program which has continued to thrive. Chief Price is a graduate of the FBI National Academy, the SWLEI Command and Management School and the PERF Senior Management Institute for Police. He holds a Master of Public Administration Degree from North Texas State University and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice from Sam Houston State University. He is a member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Texas Police Chiefs Association and the North Texas Police Chiefs Association. Chief Price is a veteran, serving as a Helicopter Crew Chief in Vietnam and a Helicopter Technical Inspector at Fort Wolters, Texas upon his return.



Texas Police Chiefs Association Instructor Bio

Chief Scott Holt

Chief Scott Holt has the honor of being the department head for the Lorena Police Department after retiring from the Waco Police Department after 28 years.


Chief Holt holds a Master of Science and Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice from Texas A&M – Commerce and is a graduate of the Leadership Command College (LCC), The Institute of Law Enforcement Administration's Executive Leadership (ILEA), Texas Police Chief's Law Enforcement Command Officer's Program (LECOP), and other extensive leadership trainings.

Chief Holt serves as an adjunct instructor at Texas A&M University at Commerce and teaches for the Texas Police Chief's Association. He also serves as the Secretary for the Central Texas Area Chiefs of Police and Sheriff's Association and on the Board of Advisors for the

Heart of Texas 100 Club.

"I am honored and humbled to be in a position to serve this organization. I am surrounded by men and women who mentored and molded me into the public servant I am today. There is no better calling than to serve your fellow man."

Chief Scott Holt





aw Enforcement Command Officer Program (LECOP)




10 Course Program

Designed to encourage and provide comprehensive leadership development to current and future law enforcement leaders

Focused on the science of leadership, organizational dynamics, and developing the heart of a leader Specifically designed to equip Command Officers with critical knowledge

Upon completion, and with the recommendation of the Chief Administrator, the recipient will receive their LECOP designation.

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The Police Mission...



- "Law Enforcement?"
- Respond to Citizens Calls for Help?
 Patrol?

• Or should we be trying to prevent crimes before they happen?

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	• National Victimization Study (Dept of Justice)				
	Percent of Crimes Reported to Police	2021	2022	2023	
	Rape	21.5	21.4	46.0	
	Robbery	60	64	42.4	
	Aggravated Assault	60.5	49-9	57.1	
	Burglary	41.5	44-9	42.2	
	Theft	26.1	26.4	24.8	
	Auto Theft	76.9	80.9	72.4	

The Police I	Miss	ion		
• Average Clearance Rates for Cr	rimes i	n Texas		Colem
Percent of Crimes Reported to Police Cleared	2021	2022	2023	
Murder	56%	54%	59.8%	
Rape	18%	20%	19.7%	
Robbery	20%	20%	21.8%	
Aggravated Assault	35%	36%	38.7%	
Burglary	8%	8%	9.6%	
Theft	8%	9%	10.5%	
Auto Theft	9%	9%	7.5%	




















Texas Police Chiefs Association Foundation





Sir Robert Peel 3 CORE IDEAS



- The goal is preventing crime, not catching criminals. If the police stop crime before it happens, we don't have to punish citizens or suppress their rights. An effective police department doesn't have high arrest stats; its community has low crime rates.
- The key to preventing crime is earning public support. Every community member must share the responsibility of preventing crime, as if they were all volunteer members of the force. They will only accept this responsibility if the community supports and trusts the police.
- The police earn public support by respecting community principles. Winning public approval requires hard work to build reputation: enforcing the laws impartially, hiring officers who represent and understand the community, and using force only as a last resort.

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Police Operations Research...Our History

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THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY

• 1967 President Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

- Response to the Civil Rights abuses by police
- Advocates for "Professionalism"
- Better Education and Training

911 System developed

 Beginning of Research by PERF and Police Foundation





































• Hot Spot Policing... Doing What???

- The 4 "Gs" of Hot Spot Policing:
 - GO to the hot spot. Patrol, stop vehicles and pedestrians, and investigate.
 Spend about 15 minutes minimum. Overhead lights?
 - <u>GET OUT</u> of your car. Conduct foot patrol, be seen.
 - <u>GO IN</u> businesses, apartment complexes, abandoned houses, etc.
 - <u>GREET</u> the community members. Get to know the business owners, apartment managers, and the criminals...

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










































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



































What We Know Does Work...



Procedural Justice

- Best method of increasing public trust and legitimacy...
 - Allow people to tell their story, listen, question
 - Neutrality in decision-making, explain why
 - Treat with dignity and respect, even if arresting
 Act out of benevolence toward them,


that you have their best interests at heart




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












Managing Patrol Operations






Patrol Staffing Level



- University of North Texas CJ (MAPP)
- ICMA Whitepaper "Rule of 6o"
 - 60% of sworn officers in the Patrol function
 - No more than 60% available time on call
 - Call for service time should not exceed 60 officer minutes

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Patrol Staffing Level





- Time needed or "Workload" model
- Workload analysis is current recommended method
- Recommended by both IACP and ICMA
- Computes time needed to answer calls, and adds time needed for Uncommitted Time (30% usually for standard policing, 40-45% for Community Policing)
- Considers admin time per officer
- Computes total number of officers needed for patrol
































Managing Patrol Operations


















Most Commons Shifts




- 8 Hour (Fixed Shift Hours Fixed Days Off)
 8 Hour (Fixed Shift Hours Rotating Days Off)
- 8 Hour (Rotating Shift Hours Fixed/Rotating Days Off)
- 10 Hour Shifts (Fixed or Rotating Hours/Days Off)
- 12 Hour Shifts (Fixed or Rotating Hours)

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




















Shift Decisions




 No one can afford to staff where there are never any busy days.

- Slower in Winter, Heavy in Summer
- Consider Vacation sign up...limit in high periods
- Remember, new generations see sick time as a right.
- Expect 20 percent no show for every shift.



















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






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









































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


• You now have the officers you will have... • Maybe enough, maybe not, but it is what it is...

- You have them scheduled to best cover the Citizen's Calls for Service...
- You have them deployed (beat assignments) the way you want...
- You have identified Hot Spots (Maybe, if you choose to do so) and provided instructions as to when and how often officers should attend to the hot spots...

• What else do you need to give your officers to obtain the best performance???


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






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Other Optional Supervisory Duties
 Investigate complaints on Officers

• Investigate Use of Force incidents (detailed)

Supervision

• Do periodic camera reviews

Responsibility for Community Policing Area

Problem Oriented Policing

- Community Meetings
- Acquiring resources





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


















How do you allow officers Autonomy, Mastery, and Purpose? Autonomy – They work independently, allow that but with supervision and recognition for good work. Allow them input into decisions.

Mastery – Educate and teach with training, and recognition for good work.

Purpose – Remind them often that policing is a noble profession that only a few can do. We are working as a team to provide safety and security to our community. We are the Guardians.

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
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















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







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Department Culture



• What is a department culture?

- Rituals showing pride in agency and personal accomplishments (badge ceremonies, shift briefings, recognition of accomplishments, family)
- Belief and reinforcement of resilience (support)
- Understanding of the changed relationship with the community
 Accountability and Transparency





Managing Patrol Operations









Dealing with Toxic or Poor Performers?

- Offer training and development, change in responsibilities, (not lower), changes in assignments...
- Encourage positive behavior recognize and reward positive behavior and accomplishments
- Foster open communications check in daily to ensure they have resources necessary
- Take Decisive Action If no improvement, if not meeting expectations, take the necessary actions to preserve the team.

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Texas Police Chiefs Association Managing Patrol Operations

Abstracts and Overviews of Studies of Programs

Note: The following are available abstracts taken from the various reports and overviews as taught in the MPO class. Many of the full reports are included in the digital resources provided.

1. Annotation (KC Preventative Patrol Experiment)

This article descibes the results of the Kansas City (Mo.) Preventive Patrol Experiment of 1972 and its effects on resource allocation within the Kansas City Police Department.

Abstract

A 15-beat 32-square mile area in Kansas City was divided into three groups--reactive, proactive, and control--of five beats each. In the five reactive beats, routine preventive patrol was eliminated. In the proactive beats, the department doubled or tripled the normal level of police patrol vehicles assigned to these beats by the allocation of additional patrol cars and the presence of units available for assistance calls in the reactive beats. In the remaining five beats, the control group, the normal level of preventive patrol, one car per beat, was kept. Results indicated no statistically significant differences in crime in any of the 69 comparisons that were made between reactive, contorl, and proactive beats. Further, police arrests showed no statistically significant differences in the 27 comparisons made between reactive, control, and proactive beats. In addition, citizen fear of crime was not significantly affected by changes in the level of routine, preventive patrol. The Kansas City Police Department now uses a Direct Patrol Deployment System which involves a highly efficient use of manpower and crime statistics, crime prevention techniques, and citizen involvement. Citizen needs for routine, preventive patrol are still met because the criminal element is not aware of variations in patrol. Additional research is necessary to determine the effectiveness of different law enforcement procedures. Further, the Kansas City experiment demonstrates that such research can be conducted within police departments. A chart is included.

2. Annotation (Team Policing – 7 Case studies)

Examination of team policing approaches in seven cities, analyzing problems experienced in planning, implementation, and evaluation.

Abstract

The concept of team policing is generally intended to strike a new balance between the needs for police centralization for efficiency and community needs for police decentralization in order to increase responsiveness to the problems of citizens. In theory, team policing calls for reorganization of the patrol force to include one or more quasi-autonomous teams, with a joint purpose of improving total police services to a particular neighborhood and increasing job satisfaction of the patrol officers. this study examines team policing as it was experienced in seven cities - Holyoke, Massachusetts, Richmond, California, Dayton, Syracuse, Detroit, Los Angeles, and New York City. Some preliminary indications are given of why team policing has worked better in some cities than in others. the reports, which are subjective accounts by eye-

witness researchers, contain a brief background of the city and the department and a description of that particular team program, pinpointing individual successes and shortcomings.

3. Annotation (San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment)

This report presents a summary of the objectives, design, conduct, and evaluation of tests of alternative field interrogation (fi) policies conducted by the San Diego Police Department. **Abstract**

The study was conducted to determine the major effects of three alternative departmental policies for conducting field interrogations. In the control area, field interrogations were conducted with no change from normally practiced activities. In the special fi area, field interrogations were conducted only by officers who were given special supplementary training focusing on methods for reducing friction between interrogator and subject. In the no-fi area, field interrogations were suspended for the 9-month experimental period. Community attitude surveys were conducted in each of the areas both prior to and following the experimental period and a variety of data was collected for analysis. Analysis consisted of examining data to determine changes occurring within each area during pre-experimental, experimental, and post-experimental periods and comparing changes to identify differences that could be associated either with suspension of fi or special training. The analysis supported the hypothesis that some level of fi activity, as opposed to none, provides a deterrent effect on suppressible crime in localized areas and that neither frequency of fi or amount of training had a major influence on citizen opinions and attitudes. Results are held to be generally applicable to san diego, due to traditional fi activity and training there. (author abstract modified)

4. Annotation (Kansas City Response Time Analysis)

This article includes the first set of data resulting from a response time analysis study conducted under contract for the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department.

Abstract

Previous response time research is described. Objectives of this study focus on identification and analysis of operational problems related to police response time and their effects on other aspects of the police services. The three components of response time being examined were occurrence and detection, reporting and dispatching, and response arrival and citizen contact. Follow-up interview, tape content analysis, and field observational instruments supply comprehensive data on factors involved with each time element along the response time continuum. Additional data were obtained from victim injury follow-ups, arrest follow-ups, and by placing simulated emergency calls to the dispatcher. Preliminary analysis of data on 69 robbery calls indicated that the majority were made through the crime alert number, with the bell company operator handling most of the others. At least 69 percent of the respondents were satisfied with the dispatcher, officer response time, and officer activity on the scene. Data accumulation was to continue for six more months before a detailed analysis would be performed. (author abstract modified)

5. Annotation (Wilmington Split Force Patrol Experiment)

An 18-month test of the split-force patrol concept, based on separation of the call-for-service response and the crime prevention function, found that routine calls were handled more efficiently and arrests improved.

Abstract

The Wilmington, Delaware, split-force patrol experiment was formally conducted from December 1, 1975, through November 30, 1976, with a 6-month design period. The police department was so pleased with the results that it continued split patrols past the test period. In general, each of the two patrol forces handles its own functions but is available to assist the other in emergency situations. The call-response group handled 20.6 percent more calls per officer. Since many of these calls were routine, it was possible to reduce the number of twoperson patrols. This increased the need for backup cars 2.6 percent. Overall there was an 18 percent increase in manpower efficiency. The structured crime prevention patrols had a 105.5 percent increase in crime clearances, and arrests were of higher quality. This is due to immediate followup after a felony. However, this increase came at the expense of a 61.4 percent drop in clearances for the detective bureau. Lack of communication and cooperation also resulted. It is suggested this can be mitigated by a more function-oriented work structure and by better management of the detective workload. A benefit was better accountability to management and better direction. The design of the experiment, the design of the evaluation, time statistics, basic workload statistics, arrest-related statistics, and basic patrol procedures are included in this report. Disadvantages of the experiment have been that, while delay time has decreased, travel time has increased: overall response time has not changed. There is also a lack of sector identity. It is suggested that the dispatcher hold noncritical calls until the car in that sector is not busy. It is a matter of policy to inform the caller that there may be a 30minute delay on noncritical calls when all units are busy.

6. Annotation (Kansas City LOP and POP)

Report describing the results of an evaluation of three approaches to criminal apprehension tested by the Kansas City Police Department.

Abstract

Regularly providing data on known serious offenders to patrol units through a crime information center (cic) produced increased arrests among those offenders and has been implemented by the department. The other two approaches were location-oriented patrol (lop), surveillance of areas with notably high crime rates and perpetrator-oriented patrol (pop), surveillance of selected groups of potential criminal offenders. The report shows that, although location-oriented patrol by the department's tactical unit appeared to be somewhat more effective than perpetrator-oriented patrol, neither represented a substantial improvement over the more usual mix of tactical unit activities. Since the experimentation with the three approaches was completed, tactical units have been decentralized to district patrol stations. (author abstract modified)

7. Annotation (San Diego 1-2 Man Units)

The relative safety and efficiency of one-man versus two-man patrols are discussed, with reference to evidence supporting each side of the debate.

Abstract

In cities where one-man patrol predominates, there is persistent pressure from police unions and from the rank and file to move toward two-man cars. In many cities where two-man cars predominate, there is pressure from police administrators concerned about patrol coverage and from city officials concerned about tax rates to use one-man cars wherever possible. Each side of the debate claims that its system is safer and more efficient. A year-long study of the San Diego Police Department concluded that one-man cars were safer and more cost-effective than two-man units. Despite the San Diego findings, judgments as to how many officers to assign to a patrol car continue to be subjective. The experience of older eastern and midwestern cities indicates a general preference for the two-officer patrol. The pattern in most cities with high crime rates is to use a mixture of one- and two-officer units on the day shift and all two-officer units on evening and late-night shifts. New York City had used all two-man units day and night in all neighborhoods for 15 years, but was forced by financial limitations to convert partially to a one-officer system in 1977. Details of the San Diego study are reviewed. Leading proponents of both sides of the debate are quoted.

8. Annotation (Flint Foot Patrol Study, 1978)

This text describes the criteria used to evaluate a neighborhood foot patrol program and discusses the results of that evaluation.

Abstract

Three methods of data gathering and evaluation were used: (1) several hundred interviews were conducted with community residents, block club leaders, business people, clergy, foot patrol officers, and others; (2) members of the research team talked with community residents and police officers informally; and (3) the daily, weekly, and monthly reports of the foot patrol officers were sampled to determine how they had used their time. Results reveal that in the year before the inception of the Foot Patrol Program, there were 4,085 crimes reported in the 14 experimental areas. In 1981, the year of the final evaluation, there were only 3,730 crimes reported in these areas. Further, almost 70 percent of the citizens interviewed during the final year of the study felt safer because of the Foot Patrol Program. Of the 280 residents interviewed during the third year, 42 percent said they knew exactly what the duties of the foot patrol officers were; additionally, more than 64 percent said they were satisfied with the program, and more than 61 percent said that protection for women, children, and the aged had been increased. Finally, more than 90 percent of the 280 residents interviewed were aware of the Foot Patrol Program; most agreed that foot patrol officers were more effective than motorized officers. Forty tables are included. Appendixes provide study instruments and additional data.

9. Annotation (Includes Birmingham Differential Response Study with 3 others)

Current police practices in response to citizen calls for service are explored, and a decision model for applying response alternatives is presented.

Abstract

The results and the model are based on (1) a review of literature establishing present police call classification and response practices, (2) a survey of over 200 police agencies exploring service response practices, and (3) an in-depth exploration of police responses in 4 selected cities (Birmingham, Ala.; Peoria, Ill.; Hartford, Conn.; and San Jose, Calif.). Research results indicate that nearly all citizen calls for service are answered with the dispatch of a patrol unit. In many cases, however, this response does not significantly advance the collection of evidence, apprehension of suspects, availability of witnesses, or citizen satisfaction. Although 80 percent of the agencies surveyed use some form of alternative to dispatching a patrol unit, none of the departments appear to have developed a system for applying a full range of differential responses to different types of citizen calls for service. Designed by a team of police practitioners and researchers, the decision model consists of three essential components: (1) a set of characteristics to define a type of incident; (2) a time factor to identify the relationship between the time the incident occurred and the time the call was received by the police; and (3) a full range of response strategies, including delayed sworn officer response, telephone reporting, and referral of the caller to another agency. Since it has not been tested or evaluated operationally, the model is presented as a point of departure and needs to be adapted to the requirements of individual departments. The study includes detailed appendixes on the staffing of the project, the survey instruments and tables, and the results of the study in chart form. Approximately 120 references are included.

10. Annotation (Newark Foot Patrol Experiment)

This text evaluates the effectiveness of the year long police foot patrol experiment in Newark, N.J., to determine if the advantages of foot patrols in urban areas warrant the expense. **Abstract**

The study encompasses three designs. The first compared the attitudes of foot patrol officers to motor patrol officers in all 28 New Jersey cities receiving State funding for foot patrols. The second studied reported crime in areas of Elizabeth, N.J., comparing areas with steady foot patrol coverage before and after initiation of the Safe and Clean Neighborhoods program in 1973 to areas with no preprogram patrol coverage. The third design used matched sets of beats in Newark to compare the effects of continuing and discontinuing foot patrols. Outcome measures were reported crimes, arrests, victimization, fear, and satisfaction of residents and merchants. Findings indicate that actual crime levels experienced by all respondents were not affected by foot patrols. Although residents were aware of the foot patrols and felt that crime was diminished by their presence, commercial respondents did not note an increase in patrols and perceived an increase in the crime problem. These contradictory responses probably resulted from the fact that foot patrols were used mainly at night when commercial establishments were closed. Moreover, multiple layoffs and unrest among police during the last stages of the experiment had a greater influence on merchants than on residents. Residents in areas with added foot patrols indicated greater reduction in use of protective measures than

persons in other experimental areas. Overall, foot patrols improved citizens' (not merchants') feelings of safety under the most difficult urban circumstances. While the findings do not warrant a wholesale return to foot patrols, they may serve as an important part of police strategies to cope with current problems in congested urban areas and also as a valuable tool in crime information gathering. Foot patrols could be made more effective by providing special training and raising the status of foot patrol officers. Other suggestions are to increase their integration into neighborhood activities, their use for service calls, and also their use at times of highest street activity. A bibliography and tables are provided.

11. Annotation (Breaking Away From Broken Windows – Book 2001)

This book uses data on recent Baltimore (Maryland) crime-reduction efforts to attack the "broken windows" thesis, which is the currently popular notion that by reducing or eliminating superficial signs of disorder (dilapidated buildings, graffiti, uncivil behavior by teenagers, etc.), urban police departments can make significant and lasting reductions in crime.

Abstract

The author examines three ways that "urban life" is eroded: through increasing neighborhood crime, through decreasing neighborhood quality, and by affecting residents' views about their neighborhood and their neighborhood safety. The statistical models that examine these outcomes draw on three broad areas of empirical and theoretical work: new urban sociology, human ecology, and views about neighborhood quality and safety. Specific chapters describe the work and theorizing in each of these areas in detail. The author argues that the measures for reducing urban crime touted in the "broken windows" thesis, while useful, are only a partial solution to neighborhood crime. The data from Baltimore's crime-reduction efforts support a materialist view, i.e., changes in levels of physical decay, superficial social disorder, and racial composition do not lead to more crime, but economic decline does increase crime rates. The book contends that the Baltimore example shows that in order to make real, long-term crime reductions, urban politicians, businesses, and community leaders must cooperate to improve the economic fortunes of those living in high-crime areas. 18 tables, 17 figures, chapter notes and references, and a subject index

12. Annotation (Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment)

This test of Minneapolis police methods for responding to domestic violence found that arrest was more successful in reducing recidivism than police counseling of the parties or barring the assailant from the home for 8 hours.

Abstract

The experiment, conducted from early 1981 to mid-1982, applied only to simple (misdemeanor) domestic assaults, where both the suspect and victim were present when the police arrived. The design called for each officer to carry a pad of report forms, color coded for the three different police responses. Each time the officers encountered a situation that fit the experiment's criteria they were expected to take the action indicated by the report form on the top of the pad. Police reports were given to the research staff for followup. A total of 330 victims were involved in the experiment. Repeat violence between the parties encountered by

the police was measured in two ways. Police records were reviewed over the 6 months following the initial police visit to determine if additional violence had been reported among the parties. Also, victims were interviewed over the 6 months after the initial police visit to determine if the violence against them had been repeated. Findings indicate that arrest was most effective in reducing recidivism. The report concludes with a brief discussion of the factors that suggest a cautious interpretation of the findings. Tabular and graphic data and 22 references are provided.

13. Annotation (POP in Newport News)

This assessment of the Problem-Oriented Policing Project in Newport News, Va., tested whether officers throughout a police agency could apply problem solving techniques as part of their daily routine and whether such problem solving efforts are effective.

Abstract

Current police practice is primarily incident-driven, which aims at resolving individual incidents rather than groups of incidents or problems. Problem-oriented policing, on the other hand, aims at solving persistent community problems by identifying, analyzing, and responding to the underlying circumstances that create incidents. The Newport News Police Department, a moderate-sized agency, was selected by the National Institute of Justice to serve as a pilot test of problem-oriented policing. A departmental task force designed a four-stage problem solving process which involved all members of the department in problem-oriented policing. A problem analysis guide was used by officers to develop responses designed to produce measurable outcomes. Three problem solving efforts have advanced far enough to permit judgments on their effectiveness. Burglaries in an apartment complex were reduced 35 percent, and robberies in the central business district were reduced by 40 percent. Thefts from vehicles in the parking lot of Newport News Shipbuilding were reduced 55 percent. The findings indicate that problem-oriented policing can be successful, and it deserves further experimentation. 12 tables, 5 figures, and 143 references.

14. Annotation (Minneapolis Repeat Call Program)

An analysis of calls made to the police over a 1-year period in Minneapolis demonstrates that police work is concentrated in a small number of locations and provides justification for assigning extra resources to these locations as a way of reducing total calls to police. **Abstract**

Implicit in proposals for problem-oriented policing is a strong critique of the prevailing 'dial-acop' system of allocating most police resources on the basis of phone calls police receive. In this research, a data base was constructed from Minneapolis' computerized police call records for a 1-year period beginning December 15, 1985. Approximately one-third of the calls involved angry conflicts that could, or had already, erupted into violence. Actual or potential property crime accounted for 29 percent and traffic control 19 percent. Service calls, such as lockouts or medical aid, comprised 13 percent. Only 2 percent of all calls concerned stranger to stranger crimes against persons. The analysis revealed that 5 percent of the estimated 172,000 addresses and intersections in Minneapolis were the subject of 64 percent of 321,174 calls to the police. About 60 percent of the addresses produced no calls, and of the 40 percent with calls, over half had only 1 call. The top five locations with any calls produced 48.8 percent of the calls. The paper describes the project's methodology and a proactive policing strategy to reduce calls being tried by the Minneapolis police. Graphs, tables, and 11 references.

15. Annotation (Re-Examining the Minneapolis Repeat Call Program)

This dissertation reexamines statistical findings of the 1987 Minneapolis Repeat Call Address Policing (RECAP) Experiment of the Crime Control Institute and Minneapolis Police Department, explaining results in the context of field observations and content analysis of officers' case files. Data set archived by the NIJ Data Resources Program at the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, located at URL http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/nacjd.

Abstract

As originally designed the RECAP experiment created and examined the calls-for-service records of the 500 most active addresses (in terms of calls for police service) in Minneapolis, Minn. The data source was a series of archived "dump tapes" created by the Minneapolis Emergency Communications Center. This study corrects the main flaws of the original randomization, address fragmentation, and the presence of duplicate call lines. T-test procedures comparing reranked pairs of addresses (236) in reconstructed databases confirm the original findings of no statistically significant differences between treatment and control groups. Further analysis finds no differences in subgroups by type of address and none by type of crime. Statistically significant reductions are found for residential addresses with low levels of treatment (77); diminished statistical power restrains generalization. Qualitative sections examine RECAP in terms of officers' problem identification, resistance encountered, relationships to external agencies and within the police department, and problemsolving technologies. The experiment's definition of a problem as "an address with a high call load" did not always produce targets amenable to intervention. Problems at RECAP addresses were conglomerations of human interaction; the effectiveness of traditional crime-prevention activities was minimal. RECAP methods of problemsolving were primarily disseminating information, persuasion, coercion, and limited law enforcement actions. Resistance throughout the police department limited the effectiveness of actions that required support from patrol units. Interdependencies, process factors, and ethical issues raised by the problem- oriented tactics are discussed. A comparison of incident- driven policing to the problem-oriented policing is outlined. Appended tabular data and 135 references

16. Annotation (New Haven Directed Patrol)

An overview of this project which uses computerized crime data in patrol planning and in developing patrol strategies is presented.

Abstract

The directed deterrent patrol, developed by the New Haven Department of Police Services, was intended to supplement traditional random patrol. Computerized crime data are utilized to plan and develop patrol strategies in order to deter crime in target areas. A planning team develops step-by-step strategies and tactics in the form of written instructions in a special notebook. Officers are dispatched to perform in deterrent patrols ('d-runs') which correspond to these written instructions. Upon initiating a d-run, the officer consults the notebook for the

instruction sheet, which also acts as a valuable source for future strategies. The planning team monitors the project closely; its members plan document patrol strategies, collect and analyze crime data, and evaluate the results of the deterrent tactics. In the future, one hopes to train patrol supervisors in operation management skills that will enable them to equal the capabilities of the planning team. The future project will also replace the traditional beat structure by directed daily patrol activities. To accommodate the anticipated additional work load, the communications section will be refined. More efficient responses to calls-for-service will be established to create additional patrol work hours. Preliminary attempts have been made to measure the effect of directed deterrent patrol on crime rates. Results obtained over a 6-month period in d-run test areas (percent totals were maintained manually) indicated a marked decrease in crime frequency of reported target crimes. The directed deterrent patrol may be the preventive patrol deployment method for other police agencies to adopt.

17. Annotation (Phoenix Repeat Offender Program)

A randomized field experiment was used to evaluate the impact of efforts at post-arrest case enhancement by a special repeat offender unit of the Phoenix (Arizona) Police Department. **Abstract**

Repeat offender programs (ROP) involve cooperation between police and prosecutors to identify, convict, and incarcerate offenders who are likely to be committing crimes at very high rates. In this experiment, offenders were assigned randomly to two groups, referred to as "experimentals" and "controls." The experimentals were the offenders assigned as targets of the ROP whose cases were to receive special attention by the ROP unit. The criteria used as a basis for identifying potential ROP candidates were: current activity, substance abuse, lifestyle, probation failure, felony convictions, prior juvenile record, past informant activity, family background, and method of operation. Analysis of follow-up criminal history records for the first 6 to 18 months after the initial assignment showed that offenders designated as eligible for ROP treatment were in fact high-risk individuals. There was no significant increase in conviction rate for the experimental cases, but there were significant increases in the likelihood of commitment to prison and in the length of term imposed. 4 tables, 4 figures, 14 footnotes, and 20 references (Author abstract modified)

18. Discussed in this Brief: The Kansas City Gun Reduction Program

An evaluation of a police patrol project to reduce gun violence, driveby shootings, and homicides in a patrol beat where the homicide rate was 20 times higher than the national average. Key issues: Gun crime is rising rapidly nationwide, while other types of crime are falling. The need for strategies to control gun crime is critical. If police could get more guns off the street, would there be fewer gun crimes? This was the question posed by the Kansas City Program.

19. Philadelphia Foot Patrol Study

This police foot patrol strategy involved rookie officers patrolling an average beat of 1.3 miles during one shift per day in hot spots in Philadelphia, PA. This program is rated Effective. Compared with the control areas, there were statistically significant reductions in reported violent crime in patrolled areas, although the effect faded once officers were removed from their targeted beats.

This program's rating is based on evidence that includes at least one high-quality

20. Annotation (New Haven Smart Policing Initiative)

This issue of the Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) Spotlight Report (August 2016) reviews the implementation and impact of the application of the SPI model to reduce rising rates of violent crime and the number of local shootings in New Haven, Connecticut.

Abstract

The targeted hot spot was one of the most violent neighborhoods ("Newhallville") in the city, as determined by data analysis of gun-related violence. Crime trends in Newhallville were compared to those in four comparison neighborhoods chosen for their similar histories of violent crime. Over the 13-week intervention period, Newhallville experienced a 19- percent reduction in violent crime throughout the neighborhood and a 36-percent reduction in violent crime within the high-risk areas of Newhallville. In the 13 weeks following the intervention, there was a further 41-percent decline in violent crime at the neighborhood level and a 56-percent decline in high-risk areas. The three-pronged intervention based on data analysis consisted of outreach and community engagement, especially with block groups; data-driven, enhanced police foot patrols; and a modified problem-oriented policing technique. The New Haven SPI experience has lessons for both police managers and line officers. For managers, the lesson is that the problem-oriented policing model is adaptable, and departments can modify it to fit challenges or situations unique to a particular community. For line officers, the lesson is that officer input and activity in intervention implementation, along with accurate data collection and feedback, are vital in the success of an intervention. 5 tables .

Managing Patrol Operations

Patrol Staffing Computation

Version 2021.3 (9/9/21)

	Α.	Enter Number of Citizen Generated Calls Dispatched for a full Year	Calls
	В.	Enter Average Time on Call (as a decimal of 1 hour - 45 minutes = .75	Hours
	С	Compute Total Time Needed to handle Citizen's Calls for Service (A x B)	Hours
	D.	Enter number of calls where Written Report required.	Reports
pu	E.	Enter Average Report Writing time (as decimal of 1 hour - 45 minutes = .75)	Hours
mai	F.	Compute Total Time needed to write Reports (D x E)	Hours
Del			
Citizen Demand	G.	Enter Total Arrests made from Calls for Service (not On-View Arrests)	Arrests
Citiz		Enter average time needed to process prisoner and reports (decimal)	Hours
	١.	Compute total time needed to process prisoners from Calls for Service (G x H)	Hours
	J.	Estimate total Special Assignment Hours per Year (Dept. Total)	Hours
	•••		
	K	Compute total time needed to handle Calls and S.A (Add C + F + I+J)	Hours
			i louio
~	1	Standard Hours worked by police officers in one year.	Hours
oilit		Average Vac. Holiday, Comp Hours per officer per year.	Hours
ilat		Average Sick Hours per year per officer.	Hours
٩va		Average Admin Time (Workers Comp, Suspension, Berevement) per officer.	Hours
er /			
Officer Availability		Average Training Hours per officer per year.	Hours
0	Q.	Compute average officer work hours per year. (Subtract M,N,O, and P from L)	Hours
·		Enter Number of Hours per Shift	Hours
Admin.	S. _	Compute Average number of shifts worked by officer in one year. (Q/R)	Shifts
Ρq	Ι.	Estimate Average Administrative and unrecoverable Time per officer per shift.	Hours
	U.	Compute Total Administrative Time per officer for year. (S x T)	Hours
			T
	V.	Compute actual total Work hours per officer per year. (Q minus U)	Hours
s			
ion	W.	Enter desired percentage of time for Self initiated Activity (decimal)	
ıtat			
ndu	Х.	Reenter Total Time Needed to handle Citizen Calls (from K above)	Hours
Computations	Υ.	Compute Total Time Needed for Calls and Self Initiated X/(1 minus W)	Hours
	Ζ.	Compute number of Officers Needed (Y / V)	Officers